[Privacy] All bugged, the Guarantor updates the rules on video surveillance.
In recent years increased exponentially the number of devices used for video surveillance. The cities are full of cameras, businesses will have advanced systems for video surveillance, thousands of cameras are ready quotidinamanente taking pictures to cars that exceed the speed limits imposed by the Highway Code, the public transport resume our movements and so on and so forth. Nowadays, it is really difficult to do business in public without being filmed by surveillance cameras. This circumstance has finally realized even the Privacy Guarantor who emenato the measure April 8, 2010 to update the now obsolete rules videosoveglianza dating back to 2004. What will change for people installing these systems? And most importantly, you can ensure a good level of privacy for citizens? In this short article I will not dwell on all the formalities to be carried out to comply with the new provision of the Guarantor, but I'll try to point out some aspects of the "affair surveillance" that I consider interesting.
At a first reading of the measure in question, it is immediately evident that the Privacy deemed it necessary to intervene in a matter which in the last few days has taken reach very different from that of just 5 years ago. No wonder, then read the premise that:
[...] Certain provisions of the law have attributed to the mayors and municipalities specific powers to ensure public safety and urban security, while other rules, state and regional activities also forms of economic incentives in favor of government and private entities in order to increase the use of video surveillance as a form of passive defense, control and deterrence of criminal phenomena and vandalism.
In fact, especially if it is customary to walk, the number of cameras watching us is nothing short of impressive. In my city ( Power ) in a few months have been installed over a hundred cameras and, in fact, it is impossible to move without being taken. Honestly not very happy about this because, even because I think too much having to "observe" tens of thousands of people in transit daily for 1-2 crimes every year (if anything were identified thanks to the cameras). What worries me even more, there are two other data. The first is the study that was done back in 2005 in England - home of video surveillance - which highlights the almost total uselessness of these methods for the prevention of crimes. The second is the cost of video surveillance in large cities assumes the scope of digits to six zeros! But it is really worth?
My thoughts are for which, after reading the premise of the order of 8 April 2010 of the Data Protection Authority, I would expect to find at least a more stringent regulation in the case of use of video surveillance in the interests of public safety. Instead, I see that once again when the cameras are used for these purposes is still not obligatory to carry out signaling the presence of the instrument, even if the Guarantor "hopes" turnaround and "hopes" that you use the signs signaling the presence of video surveillance. Honestly is a bit 'little hope, but the effort of the Guarantor, given its limited powers in this area, it must be appreciated, however, because even if the goal of telelcamere is to prevent the risk'm not a contradiction to the alert. If, instead, the cameras were installed by the city for urban security purposes only, it will be mandatory to be notified in the entrance area under surveillance, unless the procedure is not carried out for the purpose of protecting public safety, prevention, detection or suppression of crime, in which case, as I said, no obligation thenar!
I found it very interesting also to the provisions on video surveillance with the use of instruments that require prior authorization. In particular, in paragraph 3.2 of the Provision of 8 April 2010 is extended from the past to the scope of the preliminary on devices that use software to make "recognition of the person through connection or intersection or image comparison detected (eg. Morphology face) with other specific personal data, particularly biometric data, or by comparing its image with a sampling of subjects preconceived recognition thereof "
Are then introduced preventive controls also called intelligent tools, namely:
you do not just shoot and record images, but they are able to automatically detect abnormal events or behaviors, report them, and possibly record them.
And to follow, even more interesting, is what the Guarantor says about such systems:
In principle, such systems should be considered excessive in relation to the normal activities of surveillance, as they can cause effects particularly invasive on the sphere of self-determination of and, consequently, on its behavior
Another innovation introduced with the measure last April regarding the use of cameras or webcams online with promotional purposes. In this case it is essential to use systems that make it impossible to identify people who are shot. The reason is easy to understand and it says the same Guarantor: Data is collected and placed online. It 'clear that the damage could be caused to those who were involuntarily taken and identified online in places where it should not
Video surveillance is now a widespread phenomenon and, alas, somewhat uncontrollable. The provision of the Guarantor of 8 April 2010 has slightly modified the previous situation, but it did not and could not solve the biggest problem is the need for citizens to trust in those who use / manages these tools in the hope that ' use of data collected fully respect the laws. For the rest it is important to know at least our rights. So, for a more complete picture on the new rules on the subject of surveillance, you can read the full text of the measure that you find here or you can read the handbook that found at this address .
I can only conclude by saying that the new rules will have to be adopted in accordance with this scheme:
a) within twelve months, make the information visible even when the system v ideosorveglianza is possibly active during the night;
b) within six months, subject the treatments that present specific risks to the rights and freedoms fondam ental of those concerned, the preliminary verification pursuant to art. 17 of the Code;
c) within twelve months, adopt safety measures to protect the data recorded by video surveillance systems;
d) within six months, adopt the necessary measures to ensure compliance with the following Sections 4.6 and 5.4 of the order of 8 April 2010, with regard to the integrated video surveillance systems;
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